BACK TO SECTIONS
IPC 1860REPEALED

Section 149

Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object

Replaced by: BNS 190

VariesCognizable: VariesSame as the offence
THE STATUTE

Original Text

If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.

Simplified

Section 149 is one of the most powerful constructive liability provisions in Indian criminal law. It creates VICARIOUS LIABILITY for every member of an unlawful assembly: if ANY member commits a crime in furtherance of the group's 'common object', EVERY member is equally guilty — whether or not they personally participated in that specific act. Two tests apply: (1) Was the offence committed 'in prosecution of' the common object? (DIRECT test) OR (2) Was the offence 'such as members knew was likely to be committed'? (PROBABLE test — wider, covers foreseeable crimes). Section 149 is always read with the substantive offence: '302 r/w 149 IPC' means an accused who didn't physically kill anyone is still charged with murder because they were a member of the mob that killed. This can attract the death penalty. The difference from Section 34 (common intention): Section 34 requires active participation and common intention between two or more persons; Section 149 requires five or more persons in an unlawful assembly, and passive membership during the commission is enough.

Legal Evolution

Masalti v. State of UP (1964) and Mizaji v. State of UP (1959) are the foundational cases on Section 149. The provision was essential in prosecuting communal violence where identifying which individual committed which specific act was impossible, but membership in the violent mob was provable.

Landmark Precedents

Masalti v. State of UP (1964)

AIR 1965 SC 202
RELEVANCE

Established that in mob violence, proof of membership in the mob at the time offences were committed satisfies Section 149 — individual identification of each act is not required.

Mizaji v. State of UP (1959)

AIR 1959 SC 572
RELEVANCE

Distinguished the 'prosecution of common object' and 'knew likely to be committed' limbs of Section 149 — the second limb covers foreseeable crimes even if not the primary object.

Practical Scenarios

"A mob storms a house; one person shoots the owner. Every mob member is charged with murder under '302 r/w 149'."
"A rioting crowd burns several cars; each member is charged with arson even if they didn't light matches."
"Communal mob targeting a community — members who only watched but remained are liable for offences by others."

Common Queries

No. Section 149 imposes VICARIOUS liability — mere membership in the unlawful assembly at the time the crime is committed makes every member equally guilty, as long as the act was in furtherance of the common object or was a foreseeable consequence.
Section 34: applies to 2+ persons; requires active participation in the criminal act; focuses on shared criminal INTENTION formed simultaneously. Section 149: requires 5+ persons; passive membership is enough; focuses on shared illegal OBJECT of the assembly.
Yes, and it is very common. '302 r/w 149 IPC' means the accused didn't kill anyone personally but was part of the mob that did. Each such accused receives the same punishment as if they committed the murder — including potential death penalty.