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DPDP Act 2023

Section 35

Power of Central Government to Issue Directions

THE STATUTE

Original Text

Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Central Government may, in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, maintenance of public order or preventing incitement to any cognisable offence relating to any of these, by order, direct any Data Fiduciary or class of Data Fiduciaries to provide such personal data of Data Principals or class of Data Principals or class of personal data, as may be specified in the order.

Simplified

Section 35 is the Central Government's direct data acquisition power — the most expansive and least constrained provision in the DPDP Act. Its scope: the government can, by order, direct any Data Fiduciary or class of Data Fiduciaries to provide any personal data specified in the order, on grounds of sovereignty and integrity of India, state security, friendly foreign relations, public order, or prevention of cognisable offences related to these grounds. The 'notwithstanding anything contained in this Act' language is a non-obstante clause: Section 35 overrides all other DPDP Act provisions, including consent requirements, purpose limitation, and the rights of Data Principals. A Data Principal cannot exercise their Section 12 right to erasure to prevent data from being provided under a Section 35 direction. The grounds in Section 35 mirror those in Section 17(1)(a) for exemptions — and together they create a comprehensive state surveillance permission architecture. The critical differences from comparable provisions in other jurisdictions: GDPR's Article 23 restrictions require member states' restrictions to be proportionate, necessary, and to respect the essence of fundamental rights — the proportionality requirement is statutory. Section 35 has no explicit proportionality or necessity requirement in its text. The grounds — particularly 'maintenance of public order' — are very broad by international standards. Privacy advocates have argued that Section 35, read with Section 17, effectively creates a framework where the state can access virtually any Indian resident's personal data held by any Data Fiduciary, with no independent judicial oversight or statutory proportionality constraint.

Common Queries

Yes, under Section 35. The Central Government can direct any Data Fiduciary to provide specified personal data on grounds including national security, public order, and sovereignty. The non-obstante clause means the Data Principal's consent and rights do not prevent this.
The Act does not specify a judicial pre-approval requirement for Section 35 directions. This absence is a major criticism — comparable surveillance powers in democratic countries typically require judicial authorisation.
Non-compliance with a Section 35 direction would be a contravention of the Act. Given the non-obstante clause, a Data Fiduciary cannot rely on the Data Principal's consent or rights as a basis for refusal.

Legal Context

Section 35 responds to the government's requirement for data access powers that operate outside the DPDP consent and rights framework. Earlier draft bills had similar provisions. The breadth of Section 35 — combined with the absence of explicit proportionality safeguards and the non-obstante override — has drawn the strongest criticism from civil society and legal scholars, who argue it is constitutionally vulnerable post-Puttaswamy.

Key Rules & Provisions

Non-obstante clause — overrides all other DPDP Act provisions.

No explicit proportionality or necessity requirement in statutory text.

Covers all grounds from sovereignty to public order — very broad.

No independent judicial oversight mechanism specified.

Constitutional challenge expected under Puttaswamy proportionality standard.

Related Case Laws

K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

(2017) 10 SCC 1
RELEVANCE

The proportionality doctrine from Puttaswamy — legality, legitimate aim, proportionality, procedural guarantees — is the constitutional test for Section 35's data access powers. The absence of explicit proportionality safeguards is the primary constitutional vulnerability.