Foundation for Media Professionals v. Union Territory of J&K & Others
Bench: Division Bench — 3 Judges (N.V. Ramana, R. Subhash Reddy & B.R. Gavai JJ)
Parties
Facts of the Case
Following the Supreme Court's directions in Anuradha Bhasin (2020) for review of internet restrictions in J&K, internet services were partially restored — but only at 2G speeds. The Foundation for Media Professionals filed a fresh petition arguing that the throttling of internet to 2G was a disproportionate restriction, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, which had made high-speed internet essential for healthcare, education, and journalism. The petition raised the question: is the restriction of internet speed (as opposed to complete shutdown) subject to the same constitutional standards?
Legal Issues Before the Court
- 1Is the throttling of internet speeds (restriction to 2G) a restriction on fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g)?
- 2Does the COVID-19 pandemic context change the proportionality analysis for internet speed restrictions?
- 3What mechanism should be used to periodically review and justify ongoing internet restrictions?
The Judgment
The Supreme Court constituted a Special Committee to examine and review the restrictions on internet speeds in J&K, and directed that the Committee consider the necessity of maintaining 2G restrictions against the background of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court held that the standards laid down in Anuradha Bhasin (2020) — proportionality, necessity, and periodic review — apply equally to speed throttling as to complete shutdowns. Restricting internet to 2G (which effectively prevents access to high-bandwidth services like telemedicine, video-based education, and news streaming) is a restriction on the medium of expression and trade, subject to constitutional review. The Court did not immediately order restoration of 4G but created a framework for review.
Key Principles Laid Down
SPEED THROTTLING IS A RESTRICTION ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: Reducing internet speed to the point where access to essential services becomes practically impossible is a restriction on the freedom of expression and trade under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) — it is not a constitutionally neutral act merely because some internet remains available.
ANURADHA BHASIN STANDARDS APPLY TO THROTTLING: The proportionality, necessity, and periodic review requirements from Anuradha Bhasin (2020) apply equally to internet speed throttling. The government must justify ongoing restrictions periodically.
COVID-19 AND INTERNET ACCESS — PUBLIC HEALTH DIMENSION: The Court recognised that in the COVID-19 pandemic context, high-speed internet was essential for telemedicine, online education, and public health communication. Restricting internet to 2G during a public health emergency raises heightened proportionality concerns.
SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR PERIODIC REVIEW: The Court's direction to constitute a Special Committee introduced an institutional review mechanism for ongoing internet restrictions — ensuring judicial oversight of executive decisions on connectivity.
Impact on Indian Law
Foundation for Media Professionals (2020) extended the Anuradha Bhasin framework from complete shutdowns to speed throttling, establishing that any meaningful restriction on internet access — whether complete or partial — is subject to constitutional scrutiny. The case is significant for the pandemic-era recognition that internet access is an essential service with public health implications. It complements Anuradha Bhasin as the second pillar of India's internet rights jurisprudence.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is restricting internet to 2G speed in J&K a violation of fundamental rights?
Yes, according to Foundation for Media Professionals v. UT of J&K (2020). The Supreme Court held that speed throttling — restricting internet to 2G — is a restriction on fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g), subject to the same proportionality and periodic review standards as a complete shutdown. Restricting internet to speeds that prevent access to telemedicine, education, and journalism is not constitutionally neutral merely because some connectivity exists.