Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v. State of NCT of Delhi
Bench: Division Bench — 2 Judges (G.S. Singhvi & S.J. Mukhopadhaya JJ)
Parties
Facts of the Case
Devender Pal Singh Bhullar was convicted of a 1993 bomb blast in Delhi that killed nine persons, and sentenced to death. His mercy petition to the President was rejected after a delay of approximately eight years. He filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court arguing that the prolonged delay in deciding his mercy petition — during which he suffered mental agony and uncertainty — violated Article 21 and should commute his death sentence to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court dismissed his petition in 2013, holding that delay in mercy petition alone cannot be a ground for commutation in terror cases.
Legal Issues Before the Court
- 1Can delay in disposal of a mercy petition under Article 72 be a ground for commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment?
- 2Is there any distinction between terror-related cases and ordinary criminal cases for the purpose of commutation on account of mercy petition delay?
- 3Does prolonged delay in the execution of a death sentence violate Article 21's right to life with dignity?
The Judgment
The Supreme Court dismissed Bhullar's petition by a 2:0 majority. The Court held that while delay in disposal of a mercy petition under Article 72 can in appropriate cases be a ground for commutation — consistent with the later ruling in Shatrughan Chauhan (2014) — cases involving terrorism-related offences and multiple civilian deaths occupy a special category. In such cases, the Court declined to treat delay as automatically entitling commutation. The Court distinguished Bhullar from ordinary murder cases on the ground that terrorist offences strike at the root of the state and society. This case is best understood together with Shatrughan Chauhan (2014) which softened the absolute position in Bhullar for non-terror cases.
Key Principles Laid Down
DELAY IN MERCY PETITION — GENERAL RULE: Inordinate and unexplained delay in disposal of a mercy petition under Articles 72/161 can constitute a violation of Article 21 and be a ground for commutation of death to life imprisonment — a principle later confirmed in Shatrughan Chauhan (2014).
TERROR OFFENCES — DISTINCT CATEGORY: Bhullar (2013) held that in cases involving terrorism-related offences causing mass civilian casualties, delay in mercy petition alone is not automatically sufficient to warrant commutation. This distinction from ordinary murder cases has remained controversial.
READ WITH SHATRUGHAN CHAUHAN (2014): Bhullar should be read alongside Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014), where the Supreme Court (in a different bench) held that delay of years in mercy petitions generally warrants commutation — making the Bhullar exception for terror cases a narrow, contested carve-out.
MENTAL AGONY DURING PROLONGED DEATH ROW — ARTICLE 21: The Court recognised that prolonged incarceration under sentence of death causes exceptional mental suffering and agony, implicating Article 21. However, in Bhullar the recognition did not translate to relief given the terror conviction.
Impact on Indian Law
Bhullar (2013) is a landmark in the death penalty jurisprudence on mercy petitions, but must be read critically alongside Shatrughan Chauhan (2014). The Bhullar exception for terror cases has been criticised as creating an indefensible distinction — a position that continues to be litigated. For examination purposes, both Bhullar and Shatrughan Chauhan are tested together as the twin pillars of the delay-in-mercy-petition doctrine.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can delay in a mercy petition commute a death sentence in India?
Generally yes, for ordinary cases — Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014) held that inordinate delay in disposal of a mercy petition under Articles 72/161 violates Article 21 and can warrant commutation. However, in Devender Pal Singh Bhullar (2013), the Supreme Court declined commutation in a terrorism-related case despite a long delay in mercy petition disposal, treating terror convictions as a distinct category. The Bhullar distinction for terror cases remains controversial.